A typical result in patent licensing literature is that an insider patent-holder prefers licensing through royalties instead than through a fixed fee. However, when a commitment of no production is possible for the patent-holder, the result is reverted.
Colombo, S., Filippini, L., Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model with a commitment of no production, <<ECONOMICS BULLETIN>>, 2013; (33): 2122-2128 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/98182]
Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model with a commitment of no production
Colombo, StefanoPrimo
;Filippini, LuigiUltimo
2013
Abstract
A typical result in patent licensing literature is that an insider patent-holder prefers licensing through royalties instead than through a fixed fee. However, when a commitment of no production is possible for the patent-holder, the result is reverted.
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