A typical result in patent licensing literature is that an insider patent-holder prefers licensing through royalties instead than through a fixed fee. However, when a commitment of no production is possible for the patent-holder, the result is reverted.
Filippini, L., Colombo, S., Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model with a commitment of no production, <<ECONOMICS BULLETIN>>, 2013; 2013 (3): 2122-2128 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/50470]
Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model with a commitment of no production
Filippini, Luigi;Colombo, Stefano
2013
Abstract
A typical result in patent licensing literature is that an insider patent-holder prefers licensing through royalties instead than through a fixed fee. However, when a commitment of no production is possible for the patent-holder, the result is reverted.
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