In this study, we investigate firms' ability to collude when price discrimination based on the inherited market is possible, but the information accuracy about the inherited market is imperfect. We show that the level of information accuracy affects collusion sustainability nonmonotonically, according to the starting level of information and the consumers' reservation price. Moreover, we show that banning price discrimination might increase the sustainability of tacit collusion.

Colombo, S., Pignataro, A., Information accuracy and collusion, <<JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS &amp; MANAGEMENT STRATEGY>>, 2022; (31): 638-656 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/213173]

Information accuracy and collusion

Stefano Colombo;Aldo Pignataro
2022

Abstract

In this study, we investigate firms' ability to collude when price discrimination based on the inherited market is possible, but the information accuracy about the inherited market is imperfect. We show that the level of information accuracy affects collusion sustainability nonmonotonically, according to the starting level of information and the consumers' reservation price. Moreover, we show that banning price discrimination might increase the sustainability of tacit collusion.
Inglese
Colombo, S., Pignataro, A., Information accuracy and collusion, <>, 2022; (31): 638-656 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/213173]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10807/213173
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