In a duopoly where both firms produce substitutes, we show that under process innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained with cross-licensing. Each firm produces only the good for which it has an advantage, and social welfare may improve. Patent pool extension confirms the results.
Filippini, L., Cournot Competition in a Multiproduct Duopoly: Specialization through Licensing, <<INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS>>, 2006; 5 (n. 3): 201-210 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/1536]
Autori: | |
Titolo: | Cournot Competition in a Multiproduct Duopoly: Specialization through Licensing |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2007 |
Abstract: | In a duopoly where both firms produce substitutes, we show that under process innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained with cross-licensing. Each firm produces only the good for which it has an advantage, and social welfare may improve. Patent pool extension confirms the results. |
Lingua: | Inglese |
Rivista: | |
Citazione: | Filippini, L., Cournot Competition in a Multiproduct Duopoly: Specialization through Licensing, <<INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS>>, 2006; 5 (n. 3): 201-210 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/1536] |
Appare nelle tipologie: | Articolo in rivista, Nota a sentenza |
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.