We compare single round versus runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy, and hence policy volatility, is smaller because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections.

Bordignon, M., Nannicini, T., Tabellini, G., Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round versus Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule, <<THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW>>, 2016; (8): 2349-2370. [doi:10.1257/aer.20131024] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/84227]

Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round versus Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

Bordignon, Massimo
Primo
;
2016

Abstract

We compare single round versus runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy, and hence policy volatility, is smaller because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections.
Inglese
Bordignon, M., Nannicini, T., Tabellini, G., Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round versus Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule, <<THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW>>, 2016; (8): 2349-2370. [doi:10.1257/aer.20131024] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/84227]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10807/84227
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