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EnglishShould the constitution of a federation allow for peaceful secession? Constitutionally defined secession rules are optimal ex post if the federation breaks down. However, they may be suboptimal ex ante if the member countries receive a benefit from the perceived long-term stability of the federation and constitutionally defined secession rules increase the probability of a break-up. The optimal social contract trades off ex ante benefits and ex post losses, and it may avoid explicit secession rules. If transfers are costly, the trade-off is present even if ex post renegotiation is allowed. Finally, we show that under asymmetric information it is more difficult to keep the federation together and that a secession war may occur.
Bordignon, M., Brusco, S., Optimal secession rules, <<EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW>>, 2001; (45 (10)): 1811-1834. [doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00095-7] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/8055]
| Autori: | ||
| Titolo: | Optimal secession rules | |
| Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00095-7 | |
| Data di pubblicazione: | 2001 | |
| Abstract: | Should the constitution of a federation allow for peaceful secession? Constitutionally defined secession rules are optimal ex post if the federation breaks down. However, they may be suboptimal ex ante if the member countries receive a benefit from the perceived long-term stability of the federation and constitutionally defined secession rules increase the probability of a break-up. The optimal social contract trades off ex ante benefits and ex post losses, and it may avoid explicit secession rules. If transfers are costly, the trade-off is present even if ex post renegotiation is allowed. Finally, we show that under asymmetric information it is more difficult to keep the federation together and that a secession war may occur. | |
| Lingua: | Inglese | |
| Rivista: | ||
| Citazione: | Bordignon, M., Brusco, S., Optimal secession rules, <<EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW>>, 2001; (45 (10)): 1811-1834. [doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00095-7] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/8055] | |
| Appare nelle tipologie: | Articolo in rivista, Nota a sentenza |
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