TEORIA CLASSICA DEI POSSIBILI. POSSIBILISMO CLASSICO E SUO FONDAMENTO ATTUALISTICO

The current debate on possible objects entails several problems. We focused on the issue of possible objects reality and sided for the possibilist position. As a matter of fact, we believe this position to be the best suited to classical metaphysical tradition. The classical possibilism we defend herein, though, has a realist foundation that is essentially different from Lewis’ concretist possibilism. It construes possible objects as possible non-existing objects of an existing producing power. Consequently, they are nothing vis-à-vis the modality of actual being of their own, though they are existing with regard to the modality of being of the producing power. The actualist requirement prescribed by the Frege-Quinean criterion of the quantification domain is thus fulfilled, therefore possible objects must not necessarily be actual objects. Hence the sense of coincidence between classical possibilism and actualist possibilism.