We introduce a firm partially owned by the government in a dynamic model of collusion between a subset of private firms. We show that increasing the public ownership of the non-colluding firm may help collusion between the private firms.

Colombo, S., Mixed oligopolies and collusion, <<JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS>>, 2016; (118): 167-184 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/71926]

Mixed oligopolies and collusion

Colombo, Stefano
2016

Abstract

We introduce a firm partially owned by the government in a dynamic model of collusion between a subset of private firms. We show that increasing the public ownership of the non-colluding firm may help collusion between the private firms.
Inglese
Colombo, S., Mixed oligopolies and collusion, <<JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS>>, 2016; (118): 167-184 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/71926]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10807/71926
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