A part of philosophy attentive to research in the field of neurosciences tends to eliminate the subject dissolving it in an illusion or an artificial convention. These are issues that accord well with some strings of post-modernity which see the consistency of the subject collapse in favor of a fragmented and nomadic identitary reality. The text briefly addresses three fundamental ethical and anthropological questions connected to these theses: the inescapability of the subject, postulated by the same assumptions of its illusoriness; the need for a clarification of the difference between the psychological and ontological subject, in order to avoid confusing the levels of investigation and the question of the identity of the subject with the connected but distinct question of the mind-body relationship; the repercussion in the ethical and political sphere of the loss of the subject to the subsequent creation of imputability without responsibility. Lastly, it shows how the question of the dissolution of the subject is often the result of a unilateral emphatisation of the body that is resolved paradoxically by the denial of its role in personal identity.
Una parte della filosofia attenta alle ricerche nell’ambito delle neuroscienze tende ad eliminare il soggetto dissolvendolo in una illusione o in una convenzione artificiale. Sono temi che ben si accordano con alcune corde della postmodernità che vede franare la consistenza del soggetto in favore di una realtà identitaria frammentaria e nomade. Il testo affronta brevemente tre nodi etico-antropologici connessi a queste tesi: l’ineludibilità del soggetto, postulato dalla stessa ipotesi della sua illusorietà; la necessità di una chiarificazione della differenza tra il soggetto psicologico ed ontologico, pena la confusione dei piani di indagine e della questione dell’identità del soggetto con quella, connessa ma distinta, del rapporto mente-corpo; la ricaduta in campo etico e politico della perdita del soggetto per la conseguente creazione di una imputabilità senza responsabilità. Si mostra, infine, come la dissoluzione del soggetto sia spesso il frutto di un’enfatizzazione unilaterale del corpo che si risolve, paradossalmente, nella negazione del suo ruolo nell’identità personale.
Colombetti, E., Il soggetto nascosto e l'illusione dell'illusione., <<RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEOSCOLASTICA>>, 2015; CVII (Gennaio): 491-497 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/68474]
Il soggetto nascosto e l'illusione dell'illusione.
Colombetti, Elena
2015
Abstract
A part of philosophy attentive to research in the field of neurosciences tends to eliminate the subject dissolving it in an illusion or an artificial convention. These are issues that accord well with some strings of post-modernity which see the consistency of the subject collapse in favor of a fragmented and nomadic identitary reality. The text briefly addresses three fundamental ethical and anthropological questions connected to these theses: the inescapability of the subject, postulated by the same assumptions of its illusoriness; the need for a clarification of the difference between the psychological and ontological subject, in order to avoid confusing the levels of investigation and the question of the identity of the subject with the connected but distinct question of the mind-body relationship; the repercussion in the ethical and political sphere of the loss of the subject to the subsequent creation of imputability without responsibility. Lastly, it shows how the question of the dissolution of the subject is often the result of a unilateral emphatisation of the body that is resolved paradoxically by the denial of its role in personal identity.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.