In a classical theory of denial to deny A is equivalent to asserting ¬A. Glut theorists reject the right-to-left direction of the Classical denial: asserting ¬A must not commit one to denying A, i.e. denial must not be reducible to the assertion of ¬A. In particular, the paraconsistent denial of A is stronger than the assertion of ¬A. Unlike paraconsistent negation, which allows for overlap between truthand falsity, denial is assumed to be exclusive: assertion and denial are mutually incompatible speech acts. Starting from this basic idea, i.e. that assertion and denial are mutually incompatible speech acts, we outline a logic for denial. We first consider a logic for assertion, i.e. the logic for pragmatics (LP), proposed by DallaPozza and Garola in Dalla Pozza and Garola (1995) and ask: Is it possibile to extend LP so to include also the speech act of denial? First, we defend a negative answer to the question, then we outline a new pragmatic logicthat should be considered as a logic of denial LPD.

De Florio, C., Carrara, M., Chiffi, D., On Pragmatic Denial, in Actas of VIII Spanish Society of Logic and Philosophy and Methodology of Science, (Barcellona, 07-10 July 2015), NN, Barcellona 2015: 6-13 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/67419]

On Pragmatic Denial

De Florio, Ciro;Carrara, Massimiliano;
2015

Abstract

In a classical theory of denial to deny A is equivalent to asserting ¬A. Glut theorists reject the right-to-left direction of the Classical denial: asserting ¬A must not commit one to denying A, i.e. denial must not be reducible to the assertion of ¬A. In particular, the paraconsistent denial of A is stronger than the assertion of ¬A. Unlike paraconsistent negation, which allows for overlap between truthand falsity, denial is assumed to be exclusive: assertion and denial are mutually incompatible speech acts. Starting from this basic idea, i.e. that assertion and denial are mutually incompatible speech acts, we outline a logic for denial. We first consider a logic for assertion, i.e. the logic for pragmatics (LP), proposed by DallaPozza and Garola in Dalla Pozza and Garola (1995) and ask: Is it possibile to extend LP so to include also the speech act of denial? First, we defend a negative answer to the question, then we outline a new pragmatic logicthat should be considered as a logic of denial LPD.
Inglese
Actas of VIII Spanish Society of Logic and Philosophy and Methodology of Science
VIII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science
Barcellona
7-lug-2015
10-lug-2015
978-84-606-9303-1
De Florio, C., Carrara, M., Chiffi, D., On Pragmatic Denial, in Actas of VIII Spanish Society of Logic and Philosophy and Methodology of Science, (Barcellona, 07-10 July 2015), NN, Barcellona 2015: 6-13 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/67419]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10807/67419
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