This paper tackles the issue of unverifiable quality of after-sales insurance services, such as a prompt reimbursement of damages. A dynamic model is introduced in order to allow reputation to emerge as a means of disciplining insurance firms to deliver high quality. The equilibrium of a repeated Bertrand game among the insurers is analysed and conditions are derived under which more concentration in the insurance industry can lead to greater equilibrium consumer welfare.

Fedele, A., Tedeschi, P., Quality of After-Sales Services in a Competitive Insurance Sector†, <<THE GENEVA RISK AND INSURANCE REVIEW>>, 2014; 40 (1): 65-88. [doi:10.1057/grir.2014.3] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/65777]

Quality of After-Sales Services in a Competitive Insurance Sector†

Tedeschi, Piero
2014

Abstract

This paper tackles the issue of unverifiable quality of after-sales insurance services, such as a prompt reimbursement of damages. A dynamic model is introduced in order to allow reputation to emerge as a means of disciplining insurance firms to deliver high quality. The equilibrium of a repeated Bertrand game among the insurers is analysed and conditions are derived under which more concentration in the insurance industry can lead to greater equilibrium consumer welfare.
Inglese
Fedele, A., Tedeschi, P., Quality of After-Sales Services in a Competitive Insurance Sector†, <<THE GENEVA RISK AND INSURANCE REVIEW>>, 2014; 40 (1): 65-88. [doi:10.1057/grir.2014.3] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/65777]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10807/65777
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