Multiple bank lending induces borrowers to take too much debt when creditor rights are poorly protected; moreover, banks wish to engage in opportunistic lending at their competitors’ expenses if borrowers’ collateral is sufficiently risky. These incentives lead to credit rationing and positive-profit interest rates, possibly exceeding the monopoly level. If banks share information about past debts and seniority via credit reporting systems, the incentive to overborrow is mitigated: interest and default rates decrease; credit access improves if the value of collateral is not very volatile, but worsens otherwise. Recent empirical studies report evidence consistent with these predictions. The article also shows that private and social incentives to share information are not necessarily aligned.

Bennardo, A., Pagano, M., Piccolo, S., Multiple Bank Lending, Creditor Rights, and Information Sharing, <<REVIEW OF FINANCE>>, 2014; 19 (2): 519-570. [doi:10.1093/rof/rfu001] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/65762]

Multiple Bank Lending, Creditor Rights, and Information Sharing

Pagano, Marco;Piccolo, Salvatore
2014

Abstract

Multiple bank lending induces borrowers to take too much debt when creditor rights are poorly protected; moreover, banks wish to engage in opportunistic lending at their competitors’ expenses if borrowers’ collateral is sufficiently risky. These incentives lead to credit rationing and positive-profit interest rates, possibly exceeding the monopoly level. If banks share information about past debts and seniority via credit reporting systems, the incentive to overborrow is mitigated: interest and default rates decrease; credit access improves if the value of collateral is not very volatile, but worsens otherwise. Recent empirical studies report evidence consistent with these predictions. The article also shows that private and social incentives to share information are not necessarily aligned.
Inglese
Bennardo, A., Pagano, M., Piccolo, S., Multiple Bank Lending, Creditor Rights, and Information Sharing, <<REVIEW OF FINANCE>>, 2014; 19 (2): 519-570. [doi:10.1093/rof/rfu001] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/65762]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10807/65762
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