The authors investigate the causal effect on firm productivity of a switch from fixed wages to collective performance-related pay, exploiting a reform in the structure of collective bargaining triggered by a social pact. They find that an increase in the adoption of collective performance-related pay leads to a 3 to 5% productivity gain but that such effect declines over time. They show that the effect on productivity varies substantially by firm size, industry affiliation, and union density. Both the size of the bonus and the design of the scheme—in terms of number and types of parameters used—are also important features for a firm’s productivity

Lucifora, C., Origo, F. M., Performance-Related Pay and Firm Productivity: Evidence from a Reform in the Structure of Collective Bargaining, <<INDUSTRIAL & LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW>>, 2014; (Dicembre): 1-27. [doi:10.1177/0019793915570876] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/64285]

Performance-Related Pay and Firm Productivity: Evidence from a Reform in the Structure of Collective Bargaining

Lucifora, Claudio;Origo, Federica Maria
2015

Abstract

The authors investigate the causal effect on firm productivity of a switch from fixed wages to collective performance-related pay, exploiting a reform in the structure of collective bargaining triggered by a social pact. They find that an increase in the adoption of collective performance-related pay leads to a 3 to 5% productivity gain but that such effect declines over time. They show that the effect on productivity varies substantially by firm size, industry affiliation, and union density. Both the size of the bonus and the design of the scheme—in terms of number and types of parameters used—are also important features for a firm’s productivity
2015
Inglese
Lucifora, C., Origo, F. M., Performance-Related Pay and Firm Productivity: Evidence from a Reform in the Structure of Collective Bargaining, <<INDUSTRIAL & LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW>>, 2014; (Dicembre): 1-27. [doi:10.1177/0019793915570876] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/64285]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10807/64285
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