In late nineteenth/early twentieth century, British India had to face a state of almost uninterrupted turmoil along its borders. Since political, strategic and economic considerations all conjured in excluding outright military occupation, local authorities had to deploy, to cope with it, a series of tools ranging from small-scale military intervention to more ambitious efforts, aimed at integrating local powers in the imperial security framework. Along western borders, the treaty of Jacobabad (1876) had formally settled relations with Kalat (a semi-independent proto-state ruled by a Brahoi Khan of the Ahmadzai family) but it had also dangerously compromised them to support a largely resented ruler. Situation proved most intractable in Makran, where headmen (mostly Baloch) repeatedly tried to assert their independence, forcing the Raj representatives, to have the upper hand with an ever-resurging guerrilla, to stretch their commitment beyond the limits that central authorities deemed fit. The advent of Sir John Ramsey as AGG and Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan (1911) seemed leading to a break in this vicious circle. Favoured by a safer regional environment, Ramsey tried, on one hand to modernize Kalat's administration by containing the Khan's autocracy, on the other to normalize the relations with the Makrani sardars by recognizing their role within the system of the imperial dignity. His efforts peaked at the eve of the First World War. Implementing a politics "of conciliatory intervention, tempered with lucrative employment and light taxation", he managed to re-establish both the Khan’s authority and military stability on the base of the (largely apocryphal) "federal tradition" embodied in the "Brahoi constitution". This model too emerged, nonetheless, as inherently unstable. In 1915 violence spread out again in Makran, while the Baloch Camel Corps –- the main symbol of Kalat’s newly found political harmony -– ingloriously returned from Basra, where it was supposed to support the action of the ill-fated Indian Expeditionary Force "D" and where it did not even land.

Fra la fine del XIX e l’inizio del XX secolo, l’India britannica si trova a fronteggiare uno stato di pressoché ininterrotta turbolenza lungo le proprie frontiere. Poiché considerazioni politiche, strategiche ed economiche congiuravano nell'escludere la soluzione della pura e semplice occupazione militare, le autorità locali dovettero dispiegare -– per fronteggiare tale situazione—- un'ampia serie di strumenti, che spaziavano dagli interventi armati su piccola scala a sforzi più ambiziosi, volti a integrare i sistemi di potere locali all'interno dell'architettura di sicurezza dell'impero. Lungo il confine occidentale, il trattato di Jacobabad (1876) aveva formalmente regolato i rapporti con Kalat (un proto-Stato semi-indipendente retto da un khan brahoi della famiglia degli Ahmadzai) ma aveva altresì compromesso i rappresentanti del Raj nel sostenere un sovrano la cui autorità era largamente contestata. La situazione era più intrattabile nel Makran, dove i capi tribali (perlopiù baluci) avevano ripetutamente cercato di affermare la loro indipendenza, forzando i rappresentanti del Raj -– per avere ragione di una guerriglia continuamente risorgente –- a estendere il proprio impegno oltre i limiti ritenuti auspicabili dal governo centrale. L'assunzione da parte di sir John Ramsay dell'incarico di AGG e Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan (1911), sembra portare alla rottura di questo circolo vizioso. Favorito da un miglioramento del contesto regionale di sicurezza, Ramsay cerca, da una parte, di modernizzare l'amministrazione di Kalat contenendo il potere autocratico del khan, dall'altra di normalizzare le relazioni con i sardar del Makran riconoscendo il loro ruolo all'interno del sistema delle dignità imperiali. Questi sforzi raggiungono il loro apice alla vigilia della prima guerra mondiale. Attraverso l'implementazione di una politica "of conciliatory intervention, tempered with lucrative employment and light taxation", egli cerca di ristabilire sia l’autorità del khan, sia la stabilità militare sulla base di una "tradizione federale" (largamente apocrifa) incarnata nella c.d. "Costituzione brahoi". Questa soluzione si dimostra, però, intrinsecamente instabile. Nel 1915, la violenza riesplode in Makran, mentre il Baluch Camel Corps -– simbolo principale della ritrovata armonia politica di Kalat –- rientra ingloriosamente da Bassora, dove avrebbe dovuto sostenere l’azione della sfortunata Indian Expeditionary Force "D" e dove, invece, non era nemmeno riuscito a sbarcare.

Pastori, G., Sir John Ramsay AGG and the Pacification of Makran (1911-14), Relazione, in Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Irregular Warfare from 1800 to the Present, XXXVI International Congress of Military History, Amsterdam, 29 August-3 September 2010, (Amsterdam, 29-August 03-September 2010), Netherlands Institute of Military History, Nederlandse Commissie voor Militaire Geschiedenis, The Hague, The Hague 2011: 303-309 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/6344]

Sir John Ramsay AGG and the Pacification of Makran (1911-14)

Pastori, Gianluca
2011

Abstract

In late nineteenth/early twentieth century, British India had to face a state of almost uninterrupted turmoil along its borders. Since political, strategic and economic considerations all conjured in excluding outright military occupation, local authorities had to deploy, to cope with it, a series of tools ranging from small-scale military intervention to more ambitious efforts, aimed at integrating local powers in the imperial security framework. Along western borders, the treaty of Jacobabad (1876) had formally settled relations with Kalat (a semi-independent proto-state ruled by a Brahoi Khan of the Ahmadzai family) but it had also dangerously compromised them to support a largely resented ruler. Situation proved most intractable in Makran, where headmen (mostly Baloch) repeatedly tried to assert their independence, forcing the Raj representatives, to have the upper hand with an ever-resurging guerrilla, to stretch their commitment beyond the limits that central authorities deemed fit. The advent of Sir John Ramsey as AGG and Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan (1911) seemed leading to a break in this vicious circle. Favoured by a safer regional environment, Ramsey tried, on one hand to modernize Kalat's administration by containing the Khan's autocracy, on the other to normalize the relations with the Makrani sardars by recognizing their role within the system of the imperial dignity. His efforts peaked at the eve of the First World War. Implementing a politics "of conciliatory intervention, tempered with lucrative employment and light taxation", he managed to re-establish both the Khan’s authority and military stability on the base of the (largely apocryphal) "federal tradition" embodied in the "Brahoi constitution". This model too emerged, nonetheless, as inherently unstable. In 1915 violence spread out again in Makran, while the Baloch Camel Corps –- the main symbol of Kalat’s newly found political harmony -– ingloriously returned from Basra, where it was supposed to support the action of the ill-fated Indian Expeditionary Force "D" and where it did not even land.
2011
Inglese
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Irregular Warfare from 1800 to the Present, XXXVI International Congress of Military History, Amsterdam, 29 August-3 September 2010
XXXVI CIHM [Commission Internationale d'Histoire Militaire] Congress, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Irregular Warfare from 1800 to the Present", Amsterdam
Amsterdam
Relazione
29-ago-2010
3-set-2010
9789071957000
Il convegno annuale della Commissione Internazionale di Storia Militare (CIHM-ICMH) riunisce i relatori selezionati di volta in volta dalle Commissioni nazionali affiliate; la Commissione Italiana di Storia Militare (CISM) è un organismo dipendente del Ministero della Difesa/Stato Maggiore Difesa; dal 1972, la CIHM-ICMH (la cui attività è coordinata da un board internazionale di 18 membri) gode dello status di Affiliated International Organisation dell'International Committee of Historical Sciences (ICHS), parte dell'United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) / The CIHM-ICMH annual congress gather together the speakers selected every time by the affiliated national commissions; the Italian Commission of Military History (CISM) is an institution depending by the Ministry of Defence/Defence General Staff; since 1972, the CIHM (whose activity is coordinated by an international board of 18 members) enjoys the status of Affiliated International Organisation of the International Committee of Historical Sciences (ICHS), part of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
Pastori, G., Sir John Ramsay AGG and the Pacification of Makran (1911-14), Relazione, in Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Irregular Warfare from 1800 to the Present, XXXVI International Congress of Military History, Amsterdam, 29 August-3 September 2010, (Amsterdam, 29-August 03-September 2010), Netherlands Institute of Military History, Nederlandse Commissie voor Militaire Geschiedenis, The Hague, The Hague 2011: 303-309 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/6344]
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