This paper takes into account the Etchemendy’s argument which critiques classic tarskian notion of logical truth and it casts light on some doubtful aspect of his approach. The focus is the extensional inadequacy of tarskian logical truth with respect to the relationship between the concept of logical truth and higher order languages. In the end, it offers a series of philosophical reflections on Etchemendy’s challenge.
De Florio, C., Logica di ordine superiore e verità, <<EPISTEMOLOGIA>>, 2014; 37 (N/A): 79-95. [doi:10.3280/epis2014-001005] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/60236]
Logica di ordine superiore e verità
De Florio, Ciro
2014
Abstract
This paper takes into account the Etchemendy’s argument which critiques classic tarskian notion of logical truth and it casts light on some doubtful aspect of his approach. The focus is the extensional inadequacy of tarskian logical truth with respect to the relationship between the concept of logical truth and higher order languages. In the end, it offers a series of philosophical reflections on Etchemendy’s challenge.
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