In this paper, we will defend a particular version of the timeless solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Our strategy is grounded on a particular temporal framework, which models the flow of time and a libertarian understanding of freedom. The propositions describing a certain act by an agent have an indeterminate truth value until the agent makes her choice; therefore, they become true or false when a decision is made. In order to account for this change of truth value, a multiple frame structure is introduced in which every frame presents a privileged time, with its past and the possible alternative futures, which are still open. God atemporally knows all the frames and the truth values of propositions with respect to each one. Since divine knowledge of what an agent decides in a certain temporal frame depends on the agent’s act itself, divine knowledge does not conflict with the agent’s free will.
De Florio, C., Frigerio, A., In defense of the timeless solution to the problem of human free will and divine foreknowledge, <<INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION>>, 2015; 78 (1): 5-28. [doi:10.1007/s11153-014-9471-4] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/59771]
In defense of the timeless solution to the problem of human free will and divine foreknowledge
De Florio, Ciro;Frigerio, Aldo
2014
Abstract
In this paper, we will defend a particular version of the timeless solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Our strategy is grounded on a particular temporal framework, which models the flow of time and a libertarian understanding of freedom. The propositions describing a certain act by an agent have an indeterminate truth value until the agent makes her choice; therefore, they become true or false when a decision is made. In order to account for this change of truth value, a multiple frame structure is introduced in which every frame presents a privileged time, with its past and the possible alternative futures, which are still open. God atemporally knows all the frames and the truth values of propositions with respect to each one. Since divine knowledge of what an agent decides in a certain temporal frame depends on the agent’s act itself, divine knowledge does not conflict with the agent’s free will.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.