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EnglishThis paper examines the effect of risk-taking incentives on acquisition investments. We find that CEOs with risk-taking incentives are more likely to invest in acquisitions. Economically, an inter-quartile range increase in vega translates into an approximately 4.8% enhancement in acquisition investments, consistent with the theory that risk-taking incentives induce CEOs to undertake investments. Corporate governance does not affect the association between vega and acquisition investments. The positive relationship between vega and acquisitions is confined only to non-overconfident CEOs subgroup and vested options. Risk-taking incentives do not promote internal investments. Finally, vega is positively related to bidder announcement returns.
Croci, E., Petmezas, D., Do Risk-Taking Incentives Induce CEOs to Invest? New Evidence from Acquisitions, Contributed paper, in FMA Europe 2013, (Lussemburgo, 2013-06-13), N/A, N/A 2013: N/A-N/A [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/51334]
| Autori: | |
| Titolo: | Do Risk-Taking Incentives Induce CEOs to Invest? New Evidence from Acquisitions |
| URL: | http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2267771 |
| Data di pubblicazione: | 2013 |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the effect of risk-taking incentives on acquisition investments. We find that CEOs with risk-taking incentives are more likely to invest in acquisitions. Economically, an inter-quartile range increase in vega translates into an approximately 4.8% enhancement in acquisition investments, consistent with the theory that risk-taking incentives induce CEOs to undertake investments. Corporate governance does not affect the association between vega and acquisition investments. The positive relationship between vega and acquisitions is confined only to non-overconfident CEOs subgroup and vested options. Risk-taking incentives do not promote internal investments. Finally, vega is positively related to bidder announcement returns. |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Titolo del libro: | FMA Europe 2013 |
| Editore: | N/A |
| Nome del convegno: | FMA Europe 2013 |
| Luogo del convegno: | Lussemburgo |
| Data inizio evento: | 2013-06-13 |
| Data fine evento: | 2014-02-14 |
| Tipo di contributo: | Contributed paper |
| Citazione: | Croci, E., Petmezas, D., Do Risk-Taking Incentives Induce CEOs to Invest? New Evidence from Acquisitions, Contributed paper, in FMA Europe 2013, (Lussemburgo, 2013-06-13), N/A, N/A 2013: N/A-N/A [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/51334] |
| Appare nelle tipologie: | Paper, Selected paper, Contributed paper, Working paper, Poster, Poster paper, Comunicazione, Relazione (in volume) |
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