In this paper we address Fine’s well known objection to the modal approach to essence. We argue that it is possible to maintain the modal approach in spite of Fine’s counterexamples by developing a theory of qua-objects. In this theory the predicative nexus is explained in a more perspicuous way. The rebuttal of Fine’s counterexamples is achieved by building up a stratified view of essence.
Frigerio, A., De Florio, C., A modal account of essence, <<RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEOSCOLASTICA>>, 2013; (2): 189-197 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/48611]
A modal account of essence
Frigerio, Aldo;De Florio, Ciro
2013
Abstract
In this paper we address Fine’s well known objection to the modal approach to essence. We argue that it is possible to maintain the modal approach in spite of Fine’s counterexamples by developing a theory of qua-objects. In this theory the predicative nexus is explained in a more perspicuous way. The rebuttal of Fine’s counterexamples is achieved by building up a stratified view of essence.
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
