The institution of the Committee of Imperial Defence (1902) was the most concrete effort taken by London to move away from the "adhocratic" course of action followed until that time in the field of the security policy. The CID was tasked to promote a better coordination between Army and Navy, and between armed forces and civilian power, including in its structure the chiefs of the different branches of the services. At the same time, the Committee had to develop a solution to the problem of imperial defence, promoting and strengthening intelligence and study and finding a balance between the needs of India and Great Britain, whose leaders were constantly engaged in a difficult tug-of-war for the allocation of the military budget. In this perspective, the CID was supposed to act as a new forum of strategic planning, elaborating -– together with the Admiralty and the envisaged Army General Staff –- a shared model to cope with the increasing threats affecting British national security and to provide an efficient sharing of men, means, and capitals. However, the action of the CID was affected by a long string of problems, partially stemming from the diffidence of British political culture for the issues of strategic planning, partially from the "relative decline" of British national power and the economic and commercial factors that fuelled and, at the same time, were fuelled by this decline. This state of things had long-lasting effects. The birth of the CID and the transformation that the British Armed forces faced in the first years of the XX century led to the abandonment of the traditional strategy that had made India the pivot of imperial security, and to the shift to the so-called "continental commitment". More broadly, the CID, together with the other institutions outlined in the works of the Esher Committee, acted as the Trojan horse that, in the years preceding the First World War, led to the abandonment (or, at least, to a massive reorientation) of the "Asian" and "navalistic" dimension of of London's security policy.
L'istituzione del Committee of Imperial Defence (1902) rappresenta il tentativo più concreto di discostarsi dalla linea di condotta "adhocratica" sino allora seguita da Londra nel campo della politica di sicurezza. Il CID avrebbe dovuto migliorare il coordinamento fra Esercito e Marina, e fra Forze Armate e autorità civili, affiancando al proprio interno i vertici politici e militari delle diverse branche di servizio. Contemporaneamente, esso avrebbe dovuto trovare una soluzione al problema della difesa imperiale, favorendo e potenziando l'azione di intelligence e di studio e individuando un punto di equilibrio fra le esigenze della madrepatria e quelle dell'India, le cui rispettive autorità erano costantemente impegnate in un faticoso tiro alla fune per la ripartizione delle risorse militari. Il Comitato avrebbe dovuto quindi agire come un nuovo centro di pianificazione strategica, capace di elaborare -– insieme all'Ammiragliato e al costituendo Stato Maggiore dell’esercito -– un modello condiviso per affrontare quelle che erano percepite come le crescenti minacce alla sicurezza nazionale britannica e garantire una ripartizione efficiente di uomini, mezzi e capitali. L'azione del CID finì tuttavia con il risentire di una serie di difficoltà, in parte legate alla diffidenza della cultura politica britannica per le questioni di pianificazione strategica, in parte prodotto del "declino relativo" della potenza nazionale e dei fattori economici e commerciali che di questo declino erano –- allo stesso tempo –- causa ed effetto. Le conseguenze di tale stato di cose furono durature. La nascita del CID e le trasformazioni sperimentate dalle Forze Armate britanniche durante i primi anni del Novecento significarono l'abbandono della tradizione strategia che faceva della difesa dell'India il perno della sicurezza imperiale, e il passaggio a quello che sarebbe stato sinteticamente identificato come il continental commitment. Più in generale, il CID, insieme con gli altri organismi delineati dalla commissione Esher, ha finito per rappresentare il cavallo di Troia che ha condotto, negli anni precedenti lo scoppio della prima guerra mondiale, all'abbandono (o, quantomeno, a un pesante riorientamento) della dimensione "navalista" e "asiatica" della politica di sicurezza di Londra.
Pastori, G., Il Committee of Imperial Defence britannico e gli oneri della sicurezza comune (1902-1914), in Storia economica della guerra, (Varallo [Sesia], 21-22 September 2007), Società Italiana di Storia Militare, Roma 2008:<<Quaderni [della Società Italiana di Storia Militare]>>,Quaderno [SISM] 2007-2008 443-456 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/38750]
Il Committee of Imperial Defence britannico e gli oneri della sicurezza comune (1902-1914)
Pastori, Gianluca
2008
Abstract
The institution of the Committee of Imperial Defence (1902) was the most concrete effort taken by London to move away from the "adhocratic" course of action followed until that time in the field of the security policy. The CID was tasked to promote a better coordination between Army and Navy, and between armed forces and civilian power, including in its structure the chiefs of the different branches of the services. At the same time, the Committee had to develop a solution to the problem of imperial defence, promoting and strengthening intelligence and study and finding a balance between the needs of India and Great Britain, whose leaders were constantly engaged in a difficult tug-of-war for the allocation of the military budget. In this perspective, the CID was supposed to act as a new forum of strategic planning, elaborating -– together with the Admiralty and the envisaged Army General Staff –- a shared model to cope with the increasing threats affecting British national security and to provide an efficient sharing of men, means, and capitals. However, the action of the CID was affected by a long string of problems, partially stemming from the diffidence of British political culture for the issues of strategic planning, partially from the "relative decline" of British national power and the economic and commercial factors that fuelled and, at the same time, were fuelled by this decline. This state of things had long-lasting effects. The birth of the CID and the transformation that the British Armed forces faced in the first years of the XX century led to the abandonment of the traditional strategy that had made India the pivot of imperial security, and to the shift to the so-called "continental commitment". More broadly, the CID, together with the other institutions outlined in the works of the Esher Committee, acted as the Trojan horse that, in the years preceding the First World War, led to the abandonment (or, at least, to a massive reorientation) of the "Asian" and "navalistic" dimension of of London's security policy.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.