On the foundations of stochastic non-price rationing and the adjustment of prices

The paper presents a general model of an economy with price stickiness. The model is structually equivalent to a generalized game. Strategies are vectors of transaction offers and the list of all agents'transaction offers determines agents'strategy sets, by means of quantity signals. An equilibrium in this game is an equilibrium with quantity rationing. If the quantity signals consist of the aggregate values of demands and supplies, then compatible rationing mechanisms must be manipulable and stochastic. The study of price adjustment between successive plays of the game calls for a measure of the size of disequilibrium in an equilibrium. Since under stochastic rationing equilibrium transaction offers differ from actual trades, the ratios of aggregrate demands and supplies provide such a measure. In order that it be reliable in spite of agents' incentives to manipulate, their preference structures must meet a (weak) condition.