Which government functions should be decentralized (resp. centralized) once lobbying behavior is taken into account? We find that the answer largely depends on how the interests of the regional lobbies are positioned with respect to the function to be decentralized (resp. centralized). When regional lobbies have conflicting interests, then lobbying is less damaging for social welfare under centralization than under decentralization. On the contrary, when regional lobbies have aligned interests, then lobbying is less damaging for social welfare under decentralization, provided that policy spillovers; on the non-organized groups are not too strong. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Bordignon, M., Colombo, L. V. A., Galmarini, U., Fiscal Federalism and Lobbying, <<JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS>>, 2008; (vol. 92, n. 12): 2288-2301. [doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.05.003] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/3771]

Fiscal Federalism and Lobbying

Bordignon, Massimo;Colombo, Luca Vittorio Angelo;Galmarini, Umberto
2008

Abstract

Which government functions should be decentralized (resp. centralized) once lobbying behavior is taken into account? We find that the answer largely depends on how the interests of the regional lobbies are positioned with respect to the function to be decentralized (resp. centralized). When regional lobbies have conflicting interests, then lobbying is less damaging for social welfare under centralization than under decentralization. On the contrary, when regional lobbies have aligned interests, then lobbying is less damaging for social welfare under decentralization, provided that policy spillovers; on the non-organized groups are not too strong. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Inglese
Bordignon, M., Colombo, L. V. A., Galmarini, U., Fiscal Federalism and Lobbying, <<JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS>>, 2008; (vol. 92, n. 12): 2288-2301. [doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.05.003] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/3771]
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10807/3771
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 36
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 32
social impact