Disclosure rules in many countries require public companies to report fees paid to the principal audit firm and its affiliates, but not to unaffiliated component auditors (UCAs). Reported fees thus depend on component auditor affiliation. We show that UCA involvement is significant in many countries. Using Italian private companies’ public filings, we find that UCA involvement is a statistically and economically significant source of bias in audit fee models. This bias is particularly relevant around principal auditor changes, when some subsidiaries temporarily retain UCAs before switching to auditors affiliated with the new principal auditor. The exclusion of fees paid to temporary UCAs explains the initial-year audit fee discount (lowballing) previously documented, which disappears once these omitted fees are accounted for. Our results suggest that lowballing reflects measurement bias rather than systematic strategic pricing. Because UCAs are common internationally and disclosure rules similarly exclude these fees, this bias extends beyond Italy.
Pettinicchio, A. K., Pope, P. F., Scimeca, A., Unaffiliated component auditors and audit fee models: The case of lowballing, <<JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS>>, 2026; (N/A): N/A-N/A. [doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2026.101956] [https://hdl.handle.net/10807/350739]
Unaffiliated component auditors and audit fee models: The case of lowballing
Pettinicchio, Angela Kate
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2026
Abstract
Disclosure rules in many countries require public companies to report fees paid to the principal audit firm and its affiliates, but not to unaffiliated component auditors (UCAs). Reported fees thus depend on component auditor affiliation. We show that UCA involvement is significant in many countries. Using Italian private companies’ public filings, we find that UCA involvement is a statistically and economically significant source of bias in audit fee models. This bias is particularly relevant around principal auditor changes, when some subsidiaries temporarily retain UCAs before switching to auditors affiliated with the new principal auditor. The exclusion of fees paid to temporary UCAs explains the initial-year audit fee discount (lowballing) previously documented, which disappears once these omitted fees are accounted for. Our results suggest that lowballing reflects measurement bias rather than systematic strategic pricing. Because UCAs are common internationally and disclosure rules similarly exclude these fees, this bias extends beyond Italy.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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