This paper analyses public enforcement of consumer protection in Italy through the conceptual framework of Italian public law and the practical problem of overlapping administrative competences. It first explains why consumer protection was traditionally marginal in administrative thinking, and it clarifies the role of supra-individual positions—collective interests and diffuse interests. It then shows how liberalisation of public services and the rise of regulated markets fostered new enforcement architectures, including the so-called “public class action” aimed at restoring efficiency rather than awarding damages. Against this background, the paper reconstructs the “competence saga” among independent authorities, focusing on the antitrust authority’s general power to repress unfair commercial practices and its interaction with sectoral authorities and data protection authority. It argues that legislative and judicial attempts to resolve conflicts have produced residual uncertainty and uneven sectoral outcomes. Finally, the paper shows how the digital regulatory package intensifies competence overlapping, making cooperation useful in practice yet insufficient to eliminate legal conflicts and potentially calling for structural rethinking of institutional design.

Bonaiti, A., Public Enforcement of Consumer Protection in Italy: The Competence Saga among Independent Authorities, <<COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW>>, 2026; 17 (3): 226-249 [https://hdl.handle.net/10807/348720]

Public Enforcement of Consumer Protection in Italy: The Competence Saga among Independent Authorities

Bonaiti, Angelo
2026

Abstract

This paper analyses public enforcement of consumer protection in Italy through the conceptual framework of Italian public law and the practical problem of overlapping administrative competences. It first explains why consumer protection was traditionally marginal in administrative thinking, and it clarifies the role of supra-individual positions—collective interests and diffuse interests. It then shows how liberalisation of public services and the rise of regulated markets fostered new enforcement architectures, including the so-called “public class action” aimed at restoring efficiency rather than awarding damages. Against this background, the paper reconstructs the “competence saga” among independent authorities, focusing on the antitrust authority’s general power to repress unfair commercial practices and its interaction with sectoral authorities and data protection authority. It argues that legislative and judicial attempts to resolve conflicts have produced residual uncertainty and uneven sectoral outcomes. Finally, the paper shows how the digital regulatory package intensifies competence overlapping, making cooperation useful in practice yet insufficient to eliminate legal conflicts and potentially calling for structural rethinking of institutional design.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10807/348720
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