Il principio fondativo del neoparmenidismo e la non contraddittorietà del divenire

This paper examines the neo-Parmenidean principle of the immutability of being from a logical-ontological perspective and argues that it cannot be used to establish the inconsistency of becoming. First, various formulations of the principle are analysed and their differences are highlighted. It is then argued that being is regarded as immutable only because it is not adequately semantically articulated. The paper further shows that the immutability of being, understood as an original and fundamental property, presupposes the univocity of being, which renders several aporias of neo-Parmenidean immobilism and of the original structural relation between being and appearing insurmountable. In conclusion, neo-Parmenidism emerges as an inconsistent pantheistic conception, since it places an unspoken metaphysics prior to ontology, thereby immediately excluding any form of change contrary to all evidence. It is therefore an incongruous attempt to ascribe to human beings, as to everything else, an unproven and refutable absoluteness.