My disagreement with Possenti's ontological position regards mainly the following two points: 1) the self-contradictoriness, asserted by me and negated by him, of the statement "nothing exists"; 2) the ontological status of the analogy of attribution, which he considers to be a kind of univocity whereas I think it is the true form of analogy, superior to the analogy of proportionality.
Sacchi, D. M., La domanda di Leibniz e la concezione tomistica dell'essere nel pensiero di Vittorio Possenti, <<SALESIANUM>>, 2026; 88 (2): 415-423 [https://hdl.handle.net/10807/338962]
La domanda di Leibniz e la concezione tomistica dell'essere nel pensiero di Vittorio Possenti
Sacchi, Dario Marco
2026
Abstract
My disagreement with Possenti's ontological position regards mainly the following two points: 1) the self-contradictoriness, asserted by me and negated by him, of the statement "nothing exists"; 2) the ontological status of the analogy of attribution, which he considers to be a kind of univocity whereas I think it is the true form of analogy, superior to the analogy of proportionality.
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