New Trajectories of Warfare in Space: An Analysis of Strategic and Legal Dynamics Regarding Sovereign Satellite Systems in the Military Domain

Space constitutes a primary military domain where strategic dynamics intersect with legal ones, and its complexity is multiplied by the growing importance of private actors compared to state actors. In this context, the pinnacle of competition is encapsulated in satellite infrastructures, projections of power policies and enablers of state military capabilities, increasingly framed by pervasive space law, with particular implications for private actors. The growing dependence on commercial satellite communication networks for government and military operations has exposed significant vulnerabilities in national security infrastructures. Incidents such as the cyberattack performed against Viasat Inc’s KA-SAT satellite network on 24 February 2022 with the wiper malware “AcidRain” underscore the risks inherent in outsourcing critical communication capabilities to private entities. Although these networks are not formally classified as weapons, their dual-use nature renders them strategic assets susceptible to cyber and kinetic interference. The blurred boundary between civilian and military domains raises complex questions regarding the applicable international legal framework. Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty mandates that states conduct their space activities in a manner that preserves equal access for all, thereby preventing any unilateral advantage. Nonetheless, assets that provide decisive military benefits (even the ones deployed in space) may qualify as legitimate military targets. Such ambiguities complicate state responsibilities and the interpretation of permissible actions under international law along with jus ad bellum. In light of these challenges, this paper examines the strategic vulnerabilities inherent in non-sovereign satellite communication networks, assesses the risks of relying on commercial providers, and proposes a policy framework that integrates sovereign oversight with commercial innovation derived through a comparative approach between the main existing models (USA and China). The analysis advocates for hybrid communication architectures to ensure both operational efficiency and security, by delving into the new Direct-to-Cell technology and its enormous potential for global connectivity. Moreover, this paper calls for clearer international legal norms to delineate the acceptable exploitation of dual-use space technologies without compromising global stability. Overall, the research underscores the need for a reassessment of national strategies concerning the procurement and integration of space-based communication services, given their evolving role as critical strategic assets in modern conflict scenarios.