This paper defends an epistemology for terrestrial black hole simulations based on Hesse’s theory of material analogy in science. We outline the main verdicts and recommendations of this approach, arguing that they not only fit the experimental practice but are also more credible than those supported by competing proposals. Our analysis questions the role of so-called ‘universality results’ in establishing an evidential function for current experiments, while also escaping the conclusion that we learn nothing about black holes from simulating them.
Nappo, F., Cangiotti, N., What’s so special about black hole simulations?, <<EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE>>, 2025; 15 (4): 1-23. [doi:10.1007/s13194-025-00694-w] [https://hdl.handle.net/10807/338729]
What’s so special about black hole simulations?
Nappo, Francesco
Primo
;
2025
Abstract
This paper defends an epistemology for terrestrial black hole simulations based on Hesse’s theory of material analogy in science. We outline the main verdicts and recommendations of this approach, arguing that they not only fit the experimental practice but are also more credible than those supported by competing proposals. Our analysis questions the role of so-called ‘universality results’ in establishing an evidential function for current experiments, while also escaping the conclusion that we learn nothing about black holes from simulating them.
| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
unpaywall-bitstream--360474335.pdf
accesso aperto
Tipologia file ?:
Versione Editoriale (PDF)
Licenza:
Creative commons
Dimensione
1.1 MB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
1.1 MB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
