Quando l'infedeltà del collaboratore lede l'affidamento del cliente: sulla responsabilità delle imprese bancarie, assicurative, finanziarie

The essay examines the liability of banks, financial intermediaries, and insurance companies toward clients harmed by the unlawful actions of their employees, such as bank officers, financial advisors, and insurance agents and subagents. Through an analysis of case law, a complex framework emerges wherein different justifications for liability coexist: the defendant company is held accountable both as the principal of the disloyal representative (per Art. 2049 of the Civil Code) and for fostering an appearance that the agent’s interactions with the client were authorized by the company, encouraging the client to conclude the banking, insurance, or financial contract. The author offers a critical examination of these justifications and proposes an alternative framework. This approach positions the liability of banking, financial, and insurance institutions for the conduct of their agents as grounded in the breach of a duty to protect the client’s reliance in the contractual negotiation, situating it within the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo.