Disinformation Between Knowledge and Ignorance. An Epistemological Comparison

This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of information disorder from an epistemological perspective, by analysing the internal/cognitive as well as the external/contextual factors that determine knowledge defects. In this regard, I first compare the concept of information with the properly epistemological concept of knowledge by arguing that the concept of knowledge makes explicit the two fundamental prescriptive characteristics that beliefs should have—namely, truth and justification—that, on the contrary, remain implicit in the epistemically neutral notion of information. Therefore, I provide an externalist account of knowledge according to which a belief is true and justified to the extent that it allows for satisfactory adaptation to the environment, in which the ecological, technological and sociological environment itself becomes an integral part of an extended cognitive system. Based on this epistemological exploration of the notion of information through an externalist conception of knowledge, I suggest that disinformation can be understood as the state of an “ignorant” collective cognitive system, that is, a closed system that establishes interactions only within a virtual environment devoid of any semantic relevance and appeal to rational justification. In conclusion, I point out that, although the digital revolution poses risks to the spread of ignorance due to the speed and scale of the dissemination of disinformation, it nevertheless poses challenges that allow epistemological reflection itself to renew itself addressing the crisis of knowledge with extended theoretical resources.