This article provides a detailed and critical commentary on the recent Consiglio di Stato ruling (July 2, 2024, No. 5827), which overturned the TAR Lazio decision that upheld interim measures in favor of SIAE against Meta, granted by the AGCM. The ruling denied SIAE’s ability to invoke the ban on economic dependency abuse in its relationship with Meta, as outlined in the recently amended art. 9 l. subf., designed to account for the intermediation power of large digital platforms. It found that SIAE is not economically dependent on Meta, and that the platform’s actions, such as halting music licensing negotiations and withholding requested information, did not constitute abuses or raise competition law concerns, thus not justifying AGCM’s intervention. The commentary highlights concerns about the ruling’s dismissal of SIAE’s dependency, seemingly overlooking the nuances of the amended art. 9 l. subf., and its failure to recognize of abusive nature and antitrust relevance in Meta’s refusal to negotiate. Finally, it reflects on the legislative intent to empower the AGCM to intervene in digital markets, ensuring that control over abuses does not solely rest with the European Commission post-DMA.
Bachelet, V., Meta e la rinegoziazione non abusiva delle licenze SIAE, <<AIDA. ANNALI ITALIANI DEL DIRITTO D'AUTORE, DELLA CULTURA E DELLO SPETTACOLO>>, 2025; 2024 (XXXIII): 666-684 [https://hdl.handle.net/10807/337005]
Meta e la rinegoziazione non abusiva delle licenze SIAE
Bachelet, Vittorio
2025
Abstract
This article provides a detailed and critical commentary on the recent Consiglio di Stato ruling (July 2, 2024, No. 5827), which overturned the TAR Lazio decision that upheld interim measures in favor of SIAE against Meta, granted by the AGCM. The ruling denied SIAE’s ability to invoke the ban on economic dependency abuse in its relationship with Meta, as outlined in the recently amended art. 9 l. subf., designed to account for the intermediation power of large digital platforms. It found that SIAE is not economically dependent on Meta, and that the platform’s actions, such as halting music licensing negotiations and withholding requested information, did not constitute abuses or raise competition law concerns, thus not justifying AGCM’s intervention. The commentary highlights concerns about the ruling’s dismissal of SIAE’s dependency, seemingly overlooking the nuances of the amended art. 9 l. subf., and its failure to recognize of abusive nature and antitrust relevance in Meta’s refusal to negotiate. Finally, it reflects on the legislative intent to empower the AGCM to intervene in digital markets, ensuring that control over abuses does not solely rest with the European Commission post-DMA.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.



