"Più della possibilità e meno della realtà”: sulla kinesis aristotelica da Trendelenburg a Kierkegaard

The article traces Kierkegaard’s analysis of the Aristotelian concept of movement (kinesis) from 1841 to 1846, showing how the cornerstones of this philosophical reflection form the structure of the ethical and anthropological discourse in the following years. Through Trendelenburg’s interpretation of Aristotle, Kierkegaard identifies movement as the only intuitive, self-evident presupposition of any beginning, both logical and real, to dismantle the Hegelian identity of logic and metaphysics. The reality of movement requires the distinction between dynamis and energeia, the transition between which is neither quantifiable nor rationally conceivable, as it belongs neither to possibility nor to reality; it is “more than possibility and less than reality” and, above all, it is unique to the existent. The greatest difficulty in it is the intertwining of dynamis and energeia, such that it is “the act of what is in potential”. Movement is thus the way in which the possible is real, but it remains indeterminate because dynamis cannot be verified as such; when it is verified, it is no longer dynamis but actuality. Kierkegaard’s treatment of modal categories aims to deny the possibility of conceiving sacred history, according to Hegel, as rational (i.e., rationally comprehensible) because it is necessary. What is historical is what “has become” hence it is not necessary and always possible.