In response to the crisis in the prices of natural gas and electricity that has affected the European Union, both domestic and European legislators have tried to develop legislative tools to deal with its negative effects. To this end, the forms of levy on the c.d. extraprofits made by operators in the energy sector are particularly important, they are made up in two mechanisms, the temporary contribution of mandatory solidarity and the revenue cap. This article takes into account the rules of the second of these tools, through an examination of the European legislation of reference and the national one, highlighting the aspects of contrast in light of the most recent developments in the field of jurisprudence. The analysis continues by focusing on the possible illegitimacy of national legislation with respect to the Constitution and noting that these mechanisms could be characterized by the typical characteristics of a tax. Consequently, in conclusion, the possible friction profiles with respect to the principle of tax equality are highlighted.
In risposta alla crisi dei prezzi del gas naturale e dell’energia elettrica che ha investito l’Unione Europea, tanto il legislatore interno quanto quello unionale hanno tentato di elaborare strumenti legislativi idonei a fronteggiarne gli effetti negativi. Particolare importanza, a tal fine, hanno rivestito le forme di prelievo operate sui c.d. extraprofitti realizzati dagli operatori del settore energetico, sostanziatesi in due meccanismi, il contributo temporaneo di solidarietà obbligatorio e il revenue cap. Il presente articolo ricostruisce la disciplina del secondo di questi strumenti, attraverso una disamina della normativa europea di riferimento e di quella nazionale, mettendone in luce gli aspetti di contrasto alla luce dei più recenti sviluppi giurisprudenziali in materia. Segue un’analisi sui possibili profili di illegittimità della normativa nazionale rispetto alla carta costituzionale, rilevandosi che tali meccanismi potrebbero presentare i caratteri tipici di un tributo. Di conseguenza, in conclusione, vengono posti in evidenza i profili di frizione rispetto al principio di uguaglianza tributaria.
Masoni, S. S., Il revenue cap: natura giuridica e profili fiscali, <<DIALOGHI DI DIRITTO DELL'ECONOMIA>>, N/A; 2023 (N/A): 1-40 [https://hdl.handle.net/10807/296677]
Il revenue cap: natura giuridica e profili fiscali
Masoni, Serafino Sandro
2023
Abstract
In response to the crisis in the prices of natural gas and electricity that has affected the European Union, both domestic and European legislators have tried to develop legislative tools to deal with its negative effects. To this end, the forms of levy on the c.d. extraprofits made by operators in the energy sector are particularly important, they are made up in two mechanisms, the temporary contribution of mandatory solidarity and the revenue cap. This article takes into account the rules of the second of these tools, through an examination of the European legislation of reference and the national one, highlighting the aspects of contrast in light of the most recent developments in the field of jurisprudence. The analysis continues by focusing on the possible illegitimacy of national legislation with respect to the Constitution and noting that these mechanisms could be characterized by the typical characteristics of a tax. Consequently, in conclusion, the possible friction profiles with respect to the principle of tax equality are highlighted.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.