We test the hypothesis that the number of legal disputes in Italy increases because clients are not fully informed on the expected benefit from fulfilling the disputes and the incentives of lawyers are not aligned to those of their clients, i.e. the demand for legal disputes in Italy is induced. This hypothesis finds empirical support for a sample of Italian legal districts.

D'Agostino, E., Sironi, E., Sobbrio, G., Lawyers and Legal Disputes. Evidence from Italy, <<APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS>>, 2012; (19(14)): 1349-1352. [doi:10.1080/13504851.2011.628289] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/29037]

Lawyers and Legal Disputes. Evidence from Italy

Sironi, Emiliano;
2012

Abstract

We test the hypothesis that the number of legal disputes in Italy increases because clients are not fully informed on the expected benefit from fulfilling the disputes and the incentives of lawyers are not aligned to those of their clients, i.e. the demand for legal disputes in Italy is induced. This hypothesis finds empirical support for a sample of Italian legal districts.
2012
Inglese
D'Agostino, E., Sironi, E., Sobbrio, G., Lawyers and Legal Disputes. Evidence from Italy, <<APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS>>, 2012; (19(14)): 1349-1352. [doi:10.1080/13504851.2011.628289] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/29037]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10807/29037
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