A systematic revision of the notion of facilitating practices is put forward in this paper, with the purpose of relaxing the long-debated tension between economic and legal perspectives on oligopoly. Whereas the law knows of just one collusive illegal conduct, namely agreements, in economic theory the focus on internal enforcement makes the distinction between agreements and other behaviour resulting in the collusive outcome irrelevant. However, the tension may be relaxed, at least in a number of relevant circumstances, provided the focus of competition law shifts from straightforward co-ordination on market strategies to the firms’ concerted efforts in the design and implementation of given organisational arrangements of the oligopolistic industry, to which an anticompetitive object can be attached. The theoretical analysis is extensively supported by examples drawn from some recent decisions of the European Commission and the Italian Competition Authority.

Grillo, M., Collusion and Facilitating Practices: A New Perspective in Antitrust Analysis, <<EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS>>, 2002; (14): 151-169 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/25826]

Collusion and Facilitating Practices: A New Perspective in Antitrust Analysis

Grillo, Michele
2002

Abstract

A systematic revision of the notion of facilitating practices is put forward in this paper, with the purpose of relaxing the long-debated tension between economic and legal perspectives on oligopoly. Whereas the law knows of just one collusive illegal conduct, namely agreements, in economic theory the focus on internal enforcement makes the distinction between agreements and other behaviour resulting in the collusive outcome irrelevant. However, the tension may be relaxed, at least in a number of relevant circumstances, provided the focus of competition law shifts from straightforward co-ordination on market strategies to the firms’ concerted efforts in the design and implementation of given organisational arrangements of the oligopolistic industry, to which an anticompetitive object can be attached. The theoretical analysis is extensively supported by examples drawn from some recent decisions of the European Commission and the Italian Competition Authority.
Inglese
Grillo, M., Collusion and Facilitating Practices: A New Perspective in Antitrust Analysis, <<EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS>>, 2002; (14): 151-169 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/25826]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10807/25826
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