In a beauty contest framework, public authorities decide the accuracy of public information evaluating how it affects individual actions and private information acquisition. More precise public information increases welfare whenever its marginal cost does not exceed that of private information.
Colombo, L. V. A., Femminis, G., The Social Value of Public Information with Costly Information Acquisition, <<ECONOMICS LETTERS>>, 2008; (100(2)): 196-199 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/25669]
The Social Value of Public Information with Costly Information Acquisition
Colombo, Luca Vittorio Angelo;Femminis, Gianluca
2008
Abstract
In a beauty contest framework, public authorities decide the accuracy of public information evaluating how it affects individual actions and private information acquisition. More precise public information increases welfare whenever its marginal cost does not exceed that of private information.
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