According to Hegel, the logical connection between substance and accidents is especially suitable for rendering both the relation between finite and infinite (one and many, absoluteness and relativity, and so on) and the structure of logical mediation through which we can arrive at Absolute Knowledge. Moreover, he thinks that even the connection between cause and effect is only well-founded if it is meant to be translatable as a nexus between substance and accidents. So, Spinoza’s Monism would seem to be validated by Hegel, but Substance in the Spinozian approach is not a genuinely active being. On the contrary, Leibniz’s view of substance as a centre of perceptual and volitional activity would be undoubtedly preferable, yet his Pluralism is unacceptable.
Sacchi, D. M., Il "rapporto della sostanzialità" in Hegel, <<ACTA PHILOSOPHICA>>, 2021; vol. 31 (1): 81-94 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/200223]
Il "rapporto della sostanzialità" in Hegel
Sacchi, Dario Marco
2022
Abstract
According to Hegel, the logical connection between substance and accidents is especially suitable for rendering both the relation between finite and infinite (one and many, absoluteness and relativity, and so on) and the structure of logical mediation through which we can arrive at Absolute Knowledge. Moreover, he thinks that even the connection between cause and effect is only well-founded if it is meant to be translatable as a nexus between substance and accidents. So, Spinoza’s Monism would seem to be validated by Hegel, but Substance in the Spinozian approach is not a genuinely active being. On the contrary, Leibniz’s view of substance as a centre of perceptual and volitional activity would be undoubtedly preferable, yet his Pluralism is unacceptable.
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