Two countries set their enforcement noncooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing a crime in their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after committing a crime in a country must be extradited. When extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement: insourcing foreign criminals is more costly than paying the extradition cost. When extradition is sufficiently costly, instead, significant enforcement may induce criminals to flee the country whose law they infringed on. The fear of paying the extradition cost enables the countries to coordinate on the efficient outcome.
Crino', R., Immordino, G., Piccolo, S., Criminal mobility, fugitives, and extradition rules, <<JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY>>, 2021; (23): 69-104. [doi:10.1111/jpet.12474] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/169246]
Criminal mobility, fugitives, and extradition rules
Crino', Rosario;
2021
Abstract
Two countries set their enforcement noncooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing a crime in their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after committing a crime in a country must be extradited. When extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement: insourcing foreign criminals is more costly than paying the extradition cost. When extradition is sufficiently costly, instead, significant enforcement may induce criminals to flee the country whose law they infringed on. The fear of paying the extradition cost enables the countries to coordinate on the efficient outcome.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.