This study investigates the competition between accounting rules in national contexts. Following the introduction of non-mandatory simplified accounting rules, which are intended to reduce the burden of administrative costs for small and medium companies, competition between national GAAPs has arisen. Generally, SMEs are expected to prefer the simpler and less expensive rules. However, they may voluntarily choose the ordinary ones if the related benefits are perceived to outweigh their costs. Combining Agency Theory and Socioemotional Wealth Theory, we posit that the choice is influenced by agency relationships and ownership structure. The analysis of a sample of 6.052 Italian SMEs reveals that companies which opted for ordinary rules are less indebted, present a higher number of non-family related directors and operate in complex social environments. These results suggest that SMEs’ accounting choices are not directly intended to reduce agency costs, while they reflect both the availability of resources for the preparation of comprehensive financial statements and firms’ internal and external complexity. Focusing on SMEs, this study aims to expand existing knowledge about the accounting choice of a type of companies that are still underinvestigated, despite being an important component of the economic system in many countries.

Daniele, M., Competition between Accounting Standards in National Contexts: Does Family Matter?, Abstract de <<“CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: EXAMINING KEY CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES”>>, (Lisbona, 07-09 May 2020 ), Virtus Interpress, Suny 2020:2020 145-152 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/155819]

Competition between Accounting Standards in National Contexts: Does Family Matter?

Daniele, Mario
Primo
2020

Abstract

This study investigates the competition between accounting rules in national contexts. Following the introduction of non-mandatory simplified accounting rules, which are intended to reduce the burden of administrative costs for small and medium companies, competition between national GAAPs has arisen. Generally, SMEs are expected to prefer the simpler and less expensive rules. However, they may voluntarily choose the ordinary ones if the related benefits are perceived to outweigh their costs. Combining Agency Theory and Socioemotional Wealth Theory, we posit that the choice is influenced by agency relationships and ownership structure. The analysis of a sample of 6.052 Italian SMEs reveals that companies which opted for ordinary rules are less indebted, present a higher number of non-family related directors and operate in complex social environments. These results suggest that SMEs’ accounting choices are not directly intended to reduce agency costs, while they reflect both the availability of resources for the preparation of comprehensive financial statements and firms’ internal and external complexity. Focusing on SMEs, this study aims to expand existing knowledge about the accounting choice of a type of companies that are still underinvestigated, despite being an important component of the economic system in many countries.
2020
Inglese
“CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: EXAMINING KEY CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES”
“CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: EXAMINING KEY CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES”
Lisbona
7-mag-2020
9-mag-2020
978-617-7309-12-2
Virtus Interpress
Daniele, M., Competition between Accounting Standards in National Contexts: Does Family Matter?, Abstract de <<“CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: EXAMINING KEY CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES”>>, (Lisbona, 07-09 May 2020 ), Virtus Interpress, Suny 2020:2020 145-152 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/155819]
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10807/155819
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact