In a transparent and parsimonious moral hazard setting, various types of inefficiencies of deposit rate ceilings are identified. Welfare with ceilings may be lower than welfare without these and a more risky environment may render deposit rate ceilings impotent.

Nielsen, C. K., Weinrich, G. H., The Welfare Costs of Bank Regulation by Deposit Rate Ceilings, <<ECONOMICS LETTERS>>, 2019; 2019 (179): 33-37. [doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.012] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/131918]

The Welfare Costs of Bank Regulation by Deposit Rate Ceilings

Nielsen
Co-primo
;
Carsten Krabbe; Weinrich
Co-primo
2019

Abstract

In a transparent and parsimonious moral hazard setting, various types of inefficiencies of deposit rate ceilings are identified. Welfare with ceilings may be lower than welfare without these and a more risky environment may render deposit rate ceilings impotent.
Inglese
Nielsen, C. K., Weinrich, G. H., The Welfare Costs of Bank Regulation by Deposit Rate Ceilings, <<ECONOMICS LETTERS>>, 2019; 2019 (179): 33-37. [doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.012] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/131918]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10807/131918
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