In a transparent and parsimonious moral hazard setting, various types of inefficiencies of deposit rate ceilings are identified. Welfare with ceilings may be lower than welfare without these and a more risky environment may render deposit rate ceilings impotent.
Nielsen, C. K., Weinrich, G. H., The Welfare Costs of Bank Regulation by Deposit Rate Ceilings, <<ECONOMICS LETTERS>>, 2019; 2019 (179): 33-37. [doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.012] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/131918]
The Welfare Costs of Bank Regulation by Deposit Rate Ceilings
Nielsen, Carsten KrabbeCo-primo
;Weinrich, Gerd Hellmut
Co-primo
2019
Abstract
In a transparent and parsimonious moral hazard setting, various types of inefficiencies of deposit rate ceilings are identified. Welfare with ceilings may be lower than welfare without these and a more risky environment may render deposit rate ceilings impotent.
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