Evidence is growing that forms of incivility-e.g. aggressive and disrespectful behaviors, harassment, hate speech and outrageous claims-are spreading in the population of social networking sites' (SNS) users. Online social networks such as Facebook allow users to regularly interact with known and unknown others, who can behave either politely or rudely. This leads individuals not only to learn and adopt successful strategies for using the site, but also to condition their own behavior on that of others. Using a mean field approach, we define anevolutionary game framework to analyse the dynamics of civil and uncivil ways of interaction in online social networks and their consequences for collective welfare. Agents can choose to interact with others-politely or rudely-in SNS, or to opt out from online social networks to protect themselves from incivility. We find that, when the initial share of the population of polite users reaches a critical level, civility becomes generalized if its payoff increases more than that of incivility with the spreading of politeness in online interactions. Otherwise, the spreading of self-protective behaviors to cope with online incivility can lead the economyto non-socially optimal stationary states.

Antoci, A., Delfino, A., Paglieri, F., Panebianco, F., Sabatini, F., Civility vs. incivility in online social interactions: An evolutionary approach, <<PLOS ONE>>, 2016; 11 (11): 1-17. [doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164286] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/122878]

Civility vs. incivility in online social interactions: An evolutionary approach

Panebianco, Fabrizio;
2016

Abstract

Evidence is growing that forms of incivility-e.g. aggressive and disrespectful behaviors, harassment, hate speech and outrageous claims-are spreading in the population of social networking sites' (SNS) users. Online social networks such as Facebook allow users to regularly interact with known and unknown others, who can behave either politely or rudely. This leads individuals not only to learn and adopt successful strategies for using the site, but also to condition their own behavior on that of others. Using a mean field approach, we define anevolutionary game framework to analyse the dynamics of civil and uncivil ways of interaction in online social networks and their consequences for collective welfare. Agents can choose to interact with others-politely or rudely-in SNS, or to opt out from online social networks to protect themselves from incivility. We find that, when the initial share of the population of polite users reaches a critical level, civility becomes generalized if its payoff increases more than that of incivility with the spreading of politeness in online interactions. Otherwise, the spreading of self-protective behaviors to cope with online incivility can lead the economyto non-socially optimal stationary states.
2016
AREA13 - SCIENZE ECONOMICHE E STATISTICHE
Articolo su rivista non presente in alcun database (EconLit, MatScinet, Scopus, Web of Knowledge, Publish or perish)
Inglese
Articolo in rivista
Inglese
Adaptation, Psychological; Aggression; Humans; Social Behavior; Interpersonal Relations; Online Systems; Social Networking; Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology (all); Agricultural and Biological Sciences (all)
Settore SECS-P/01 - ECONOMIA POLITICA
Public Library of Science
11
11
2016
1
17
17
0164286
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Antoci, A., Delfino, A., Paglieri, F., Panebianco, F., Sabatini, F., Civility vs. incivility in online social interactions: An evolutionary approach, <<PLOS ONE>>, 2016; 11 (11): 1-17. [doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164286] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/122878]
open
262
Antoci, Angelo; Delfino, Alexia; Paglieri, Fabio; Panebianco, Fabrizio; Sabatini, Fabio
5
art_per_29
03. Contributo in rivista::Articolo in rivista, Nota a sentenza
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
7. PLosONE.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipologia file ?: Versione Editoriale (PDF)
Licenza: Creative commons
Dimensione 2 MB
Formato Unknown
2 MB Unknown Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10807/122878
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? 5
  • Scopus 55
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 42
social impact