IRIS PubliCatt
PubliCatt è il repository istituzionale ad accesso aperto dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, dove gli utenti autorizzati afferenti all'Ateneo provvedono direttamente e autonomamente a depositare e a rendere visibili le proprie pubblicazioni, inserendo i dati descrittivi del documento stesso ("metadati", quali il titolo, autore, abstract, etc.) e, laddove possibile, il testo della pubblicazione stessa (full-text).
PubliCatt utilizza la piattaforma IRIS (Institutional Research Information System) sviluppata da CINECA.
EnglishThe bank regulation reforms in the 1980s and 1990s saw deposit rate ceilings being replaced by minimum capital requirements. However, there seems to be no theoretical studies supporting these reforms; either the two instruments are considered for all practical purposes equivalent, or the conclusion is in favor of deposit regulation. In our model there is a real tradeoff between the two: capital regulation is costly because the opportunity costs of capital is higher than the return from normal banking activities while deposit rate ceilings may result in an inefficiently high number of banks. We show that, depending on the opportunity costs of banking capital and on the severity of the moral hazard problem they seek to address, each of the two regulatory instruments may welfare dominate the other.
Nielsen, C. K., Weinrich, G., Bank regulation when both deposit rate control and capital requirements are socially costly, <<INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY>>, 2018; (Vol. 14, Issue 2): 139-178. [doi:10.1111/ijet.12150] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/121192]
| Autori: | ||
| Titolo: | Bank regulation when both deposit rate control and capital requirements are socially costly | |
| Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12150 | |
| Data di pubblicazione: | 2018 | |
| Abstract: | The bank regulation reforms in the 1980s and 1990s saw deposit rate ceilings being replaced by minimum capital requirements. However, there seems to be no theoretical studies supporting these reforms; either the two instruments are considered for all practical purposes equivalent, or the conclusion is in favor of deposit regulation. In our model there is a real tradeoff between the two: capital regulation is costly because the opportunity costs of capital is higher than the return from normal banking activities while deposit rate ceilings may result in an inefficiently high number of banks. We show that, depending on the opportunity costs of banking capital and on the severity of the moral hazard problem they seek to address, each of the two regulatory instruments may welfare dominate the other. | |
| Lingua: | Inglese | |
| Rivista: | ||
| Citazione: | Nielsen, C. K., Weinrich, G., Bank regulation when both deposit rate control and capital requirements are socially costly, <<INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY>>, 2018; (Vol. 14, Issue 2): 139-178. [doi:10.1111/ijet.12150] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/121192] | |
| Sostituisce: | Bank regulation when both deposit rate control and capital requirements are socially optimal (Working paper, hdl: 10807/28677) | |
| Appare nelle tipologie: | Articolo in rivista, Nota a sentenza |
File in questo prodotto:
| File | Descrizione | Tipologia | Note | Licenza | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nielsen-Weinrich_BankRegulation.pdf | Versione Editoriale (PDF) | Nessuna Nota | Non specificato | Administrator |
http://hdl.handle.net/10807/121192
Copyright © 2022