The aim of this paper is twofold: First, we present and develop a system of logic for pragmatics including the act of denial. Second, we analyse in our framework the so-called paradox of assertability. We show that it is possible to yield sentences that are not assertable. Moreover, under certain conditions, a symmetric result can be obtained: There is a specular paradox of deniability. However, this paradox is based on the problematic principle of classical denial equivalence.
De Florio, C., Carrara, M., Chiffi, D., On assertion and denial in the logic for pragmatics, <<JOURNAL OF APPLIED LOGIC>>, N/A; (N/A): N/A-N/A. [doi:10.1016/j.jal.2017.11.002] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/108924]
On assertion and denial in the logic for pragmatics
De Florio, Ciro;
2017
Abstract
The aim of this paper is twofold: First, we present and develop a system of logic for pragmatics including the act of denial. Second, we analyse in our framework the so-called paradox of assertability. We show that it is possible to yield sentences that are not assertable. Moreover, under certain conditions, a symmetric result can be obtained: There is a specular paradox of deniability. However, this paradox is based on the problematic principle of classical denial equivalence.
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