Several studies have stressed that, contrary to initial expectations, state-owned firms at the beginning of the transition undertook painful measures to adjust to the new economic environment. This paper investigates this behaviour in a simple game theoretic framework. It is argued that the massive amount of lay-offs created by state-owned firms during the initial phase of the transition can be interpreted as a signal directed to the banking sector in order to obtain more favourable financing conditions for the subsequent process of restructuring. The conclusions are strongly supported by Polish firm-level empirical evidence.
Colombo, E., Restructuring as a signal: a simple formalization, <<ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION>>, 2002; 10 (1): 119-142. [doi:10.1111/1468-0351.00105] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/100230]
Autori: | |
Titolo: | Restructuring as a signal: a simple formalization |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0351.00105 |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2002 |
Abstract: | Several studies have stressed that, contrary to initial expectations, state-owned firms at the beginning of the transition undertook painful measures to adjust to the new economic environment. This paper investigates this behaviour in a simple game theoretic framework. It is argued that the massive amount of lay-offs created by state-owned firms during the initial phase of the transition can be interpreted as a signal directed to the banking sector in order to obtain more favourable financing conditions for the subsequent process of restructuring. The conclusions are strongly supported by Polish firm-level empirical evidence. |
Lingua: | Inglese |
Rivista: | |
Citazione: | Colombo, E., Restructuring as a signal: a simple formalization, <<ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION>>, 2002; 10 (1): 119-142. [doi:10.1111/1468-0351.00105] [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/100230] |
Appare nelle tipologie: | Articolo in rivista, Nota a sentenza |