Linnebo argues that Boolos' interpretation of second order monadic logic (MSOL) is not logic. His argument starts by proposing some conditions for logicality (ontological innocence, cognitive primacy, and universal applicability) and goes on arguing that Boolos' proposal does not satisfy them. The problem is that, in our view, Linnebo's conditions for logicality meet some general difficulties on the very same notion. His formulation cannot be considered a good test for demarcating what is logic at all. Take first order logic (F OL ): either it does not satisfy the conditions proposed or it satisfies them trivially. A positive result of our analysis is that an account of logicality based on independency is better evaluable in a relational setting.
Carrara, M., De Florio, C., On an Account of Logicality, in Laura Fellin, L. F., Antonio Ledd, A. L., Francesco Paol, F. P., Emanuele Rossanes, E. R. (ed.), New Directions in Logic and the Philosophy of Science, College Publications, Milton Keynes 2016: 127- 138 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/86485]
On an Account of Logicality
Carrara, Massimiliano;De Florio, Ciro
2016
Abstract
Linnebo argues that Boolos' interpretation of second order monadic logic (MSOL) is not logic. His argument starts by proposing some conditions for logicality (ontological innocence, cognitive primacy, and universal applicability) and goes on arguing that Boolos' proposal does not satisfy them. The problem is that, in our view, Linnebo's conditions for logicality meet some general difficulties on the very same notion. His formulation cannot be considered a good test for demarcating what is logic at all. Take first order logic (F OL ): either it does not satisfy the conditions proposed or it satisfies them trivially. A positive result of our analysis is that an account of logicality based on independency is better evaluable in a relational setting.
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