Aristotle on Justice and Law: Koinonia, Justice and Politeia

Aristotle’s theory of law, especially with reference to the idea of justice, can be understood as a ‘different’ model if compared to contemporary perspectives. Nevertheless, in the light of the complex and globalized societies, the interest for the Aristotelian perspective is based at least on three concepts: koinonia, justice and politeia. Theoretically koinonia (community) represents the ontological model by which Aristotle understands the human relationship and, at the same time, is the conceptual horizon within which the notion of ‘justice’ and the polarity ‘koinonia-dike’ emerges. Justice (dike), as a ‘virtue’ based on the communitarian nomos, represents the ‘boundary line’ between community and mere alliance, that is to say the condition for eunomia and the political obligation. Furthermore, dike is a ‘pragmatic and universal’ dimension and community represents the theoretical ‘space’ for its elaboration: justice is an ideal principle whereas law, including epieikeia and the couple physikon dikaion-nomikon dikaion, represents its historical determination. On a political-constitutional level the central role of politeia emerges: it is a ‘just equilibrium’, based on the ‘proportionality’ developed into the communitarian context, and the constitutional articulation of the relation among the citizens. Koinonia and politeia are not to be confused: the latter is an adaptable paradigm, whereas the former is its critical filter. Aristotle’s theory is an open model because the flexible notion of justice is adaptable to a variety of human relations and, similarly, the politeia- mesotes evolves as the paradigm of koinonia. Hence the modernity of this perspective: the great flexibility of the circle ‘koinonia-justice-politeia’ could represent a theoretical model to understand the present complex societies and the issues related to the ongoing globalization, especially in order to endorse the current multiple models of justice.