Starting with a prisoner’s dilemma, a simple taxonomy of the possible characteristics of a game is introduced. This forms the basis for discussing repeated interactions and the emergence of personalised rules used in durable relationships. When by their nature, interactions are sporadic, much of the same results can be obtained by the use of social rules. Finally, the use of formal contracts, typically incomplete, and a third party to solve conflicts is outlined. The Appendix contains a summary introduction to the problem of incompleteness of norm systems.

Beretta, C. L., Accordi, regole sociali, giudici e tribunaliParte II, <<Accordi, regole sociali, giudici e tribunaliParte II>>, 2015; 2015 (1502): 1-28 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/71688]

Accordi, regole sociali, giudici e tribunali Parte II

Beretta, Carlo Luigi
2015

Abstract

Starting with a prisoner’s dilemma, a simple taxonomy of the possible characteristics of a game is introduced. This forms the basis for discussing repeated interactions and the emergence of personalised rules used in durable relationships. When by their nature, interactions are sporadic, much of the same results can be obtained by the use of social rules. Finally, the use of formal contracts, typically incomplete, and a third party to solve conflicts is outlined. The Appendix contains a summary introduction to the problem of incompleteness of norm systems.
Italiano
Accordi, regole sociali, giudici e tribunali Parte II
978-88-343-3174-3
Beretta, C. L., Accordi, regole sociali, giudici e tribunaliParte II, <>, 2015; 2015 (1502): 1-28 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/71688]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10807/71688
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