Humans are capable of moral judgment. They have extremely sophisticated beliefs about how they should or should not behave in morally significant situations. What is the nature of these moral choices? To answer this question, the author examines the study of those cognitive devices, which provide the basis for the processing of moral beliefs, and, in particular, she focuses on the idea that the process of formation of such beliefs depends heavily on the action of emotional mechanisms.
Rossi, M. G., Il giudizio del sentimento. Emozioni, giudizi morali, natura umana, Editore Riuniti University Press, Roma 2013:<<Cognitio>>, 163 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/66094]
Il giudizio del sentimento. Emozioni, giudizi morali, natura umana
Rossi, Maria Grazia
2013
Abstract
Humans are capable of moral judgment. They have extremely sophisticated beliefs about how they should or should not behave in morally significant situations. What is the nature of these moral choices? To answer this question, the author examines the study of those cognitive devices, which provide the basis for the processing of moral beliefs, and, in particular, she focuses on the idea that the process of formation of such beliefs depends heavily on the action of emotional mechanisms.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.