Given a parent-subsidiary scheme, the paper analyses the limits according to Italian company law (artt. 2497 ss. civil code) of the parent company’s power towards subsidiary’s directors to impose strategical directives about the course of action of the subsidiary. Considering the law, it is possible to argue that in the parent-subsidiary scheme the interest of the subsidiary is no more the exclusive interest to be pursued and therefore the intrusion of the parent interest allow, although with very strict limits, to allocate risk in a suboptimal way for the subsidiary.
Mozzarelli, M. C. M., Attività di direzione e coordinamento e allocazione del rischio di gestione, in Sciarrone Alibrandi, A., Cariello, V., Guerrera, F., Campobasso, M., Di Cataldo, V. (ed.), Società, Banche e Crisi d'impresa. Liber Amicorum Pietro Abbadessa, UTET, Milano 2014: 1607- 1630 [https://hdl.handle.net/10807/62016]
Attività di direzione e coordinamento e allocazione del rischio di gestione
Mozzarelli, Michele Cesare Maria
2014
Abstract
Given a parent-subsidiary scheme, the paper analyses the limits according to Italian company law (artt. 2497 ss. civil code) of the parent company’s power towards subsidiary’s directors to impose strategical directives about the course of action of the subsidiary. Considering the law, it is possible to argue that in the parent-subsidiary scheme the interest of the subsidiary is no more the exclusive interest to be pursued and therefore the intrusion of the parent interest allow, although with very strict limits, to allocate risk in a suboptimal way for the subsidiary.
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