With the publication of “Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik” (1913-16) Max Scheler emerged as a leading exponent of realist phenomenology. Nonetheless, he had first made his debut on the German philosophical scene of the late 19th century with a series of Neo-Kantian-inspired writings and, until 1906, his philosophical framework had remained that of Neo-Kantianism. Scheler’s early works have been scarcely read and, mostly, with the only purpose of finding in them what may plausibly be regarded as premonitory signs of his following conversion to phenomenology. Consequently, the Neo-Kantianism that characterizes early Schelerian philosophy has remained a vague notion. The book defines and investigates this notion through an analysis of Scheler's early texts , which are here considered in the light of their greatest theoretical debts (with Rudolf Eucken, Wilhelm Windelband and most of all Hermann Cohen) and the philosophical problems they address: what is the relationship between knowledge and ethics? If the proper object of philosophy is human knowledge in its different forms, what is the method of philosophy conceived as meta-reflection? What theory of knowledge correctly explains objective knowledge? The answers provided by the young Scheler (who in his unfinished Logik even levels the charge of psychologism against Husserl’s Logical Investigations) show how deeply his thought was rooted in the philosophical paradigm inaugurated by Kant and later developed by Neo-Kantianism. Furthermore, an analysis of two well-known topics of Scheler’s mature philosophy – i.e. 1) the phenomenological reform of the notion of a priori that provides the basis of his critique of Kantian formalism in ethics, and 2) his late reflections on the relationship between metaphysics and anthropology – reveals therein the active presence of theoretical options which can be traced back to his early Neo-Kantianism.
Mancuso, G., Il giovane Scheler (1899-1906), LED, Milano 2007: 310 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/61146]
Il giovane Scheler (1899-1906)
Mancuso, Giuliana
2007
Abstract
With the publication of “Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik” (1913-16) Max Scheler emerged as a leading exponent of realist phenomenology. Nonetheless, he had first made his debut on the German philosophical scene of the late 19th century with a series of Neo-Kantian-inspired writings and, until 1906, his philosophical framework had remained that of Neo-Kantianism. Scheler’s early works have been scarcely read and, mostly, with the only purpose of finding in them what may plausibly be regarded as premonitory signs of his following conversion to phenomenology. Consequently, the Neo-Kantianism that characterizes early Schelerian philosophy has remained a vague notion. The book defines and investigates this notion through an analysis of Scheler's early texts , which are here considered in the light of their greatest theoretical debts (with Rudolf Eucken, Wilhelm Windelband and most of all Hermann Cohen) and the philosophical problems they address: what is the relationship between knowledge and ethics? If the proper object of philosophy is human knowledge in its different forms, what is the method of philosophy conceived as meta-reflection? What theory of knowledge correctly explains objective knowledge? The answers provided by the young Scheler (who in his unfinished Logik even levels the charge of psychologism against Husserl’s Logical Investigations) show how deeply his thought was rooted in the philosophical paradigm inaugurated by Kant and later developed by Neo-Kantianism. Furthermore, an analysis of two well-known topics of Scheler’s mature philosophy – i.e. 1) the phenomenological reform of the notion of a priori that provides the basis of his critique of Kantian formalism in ethics, and 2) his late reflections on the relationship between metaphysics and anthropology – reveals therein the active presence of theoretical options which can be traced back to his early Neo-Kantianism.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.