Italy’s dependence from fossil fuels, coupled with its long-lasting choice to do without nuclear energy in power generation, makes the country highly vulnerable to any shortage affecting both oil and gas sectors, and/or to abnormal increases in their international prices. In both sectors, suppliers are highly concentrated, and this fact, coupled with the lack of domestic production, increases Italian vulnerability. Despite a recent shift in the energy mix, dependence from the international markets will remain, in the foreseeable future, a structural tract of the Italian energy structure. Efforts to override this state of things focus on a ‘whole azimuth’ strategy, aimed at differentiating the supply markets, strengthening the commercial ties already existing with the traditional partners, and putting on stream still unexploited national reserves, especially in southern regions and Sicily. Middle East and North Africa remain key points of reference, but Italy is also involved in Eastern Mediterranean, in the development of alternative routes to the congested Bosporus Straits. From this point of view, infrastructures play an essential role within the framework of the Italian energy security strategy. The opening of new links between the Black Sea, Eastern Europe, and the Mediterranean would increase Italian reliance on Central Asian and Caucasus oil and gas, and reduce national dependency from its traditional supply markets. Moreover, the opening of these links – coupled with a general improvement of the Italian LNG sector – would enhance Italy’s role as one of the main energy hub in central Mediterranean, and strengthen the country’s overall position in the European oil and gas industry. The other pillar is the development of stronger ties with Russia, for example through the strategic agreement signed with Gazprom in November 2006, the acquisition of Yukos by the Enineftegas consortium (60% ENI; 40% Enel) in April 2007, and the signing in June 2007 of a MOU between ENI and Gazprom for the building and managing of the new ‘South Stream’ pipeline. However, this strategy is deemed to face a strong international competition. Both EU and the US have shown their concerns about the political implications of the South Stream project, which would make Russia – according to its critics – the dominant actor on the European gas market. Turkey’s difficult relations with EU are another important element to deal with. In this perspective, and despite the uncertainties still surrounding the EU INOGATE and TRACECA programmes, an all-European route reaching Vienna and/or the Adriatic coast through the Eastern and Western Balkans seems to enjoy greater favour than a largely Anatolian one, somehow gravitating on South-Eastern Mediterranean, and enhancing Ankara’s bargaining power. Political and economic considerations, both at domestic and international level, will, thus, intermingle in defining Italian strategy’s effective viability. Not to forget the role that Asia’s increasing energy demand will play in the future, and the effects it will have on commercial decisions of the Former Soviet Republics and of the Gulf countries.
La dipendenza dell'Italia dai combustibili fossili, unita alla scelta consolidata di rinunciare all’utilizzo del nucleare nel campo della generazione energetica, rende il paese altamente vulnerabile a qualsiasi carenza interessi i settori del petrolio e del gas e/o a un aumento anomalo dei prezzi internazionali. L’alto grado di concentrazione dei fornitori in entrambi i settori, unito alla mancanza, di fatto, di una produzione nazionale concorre ad aumentare la vulnerabilità italiana, e nonostante i recenti spostamenti nel mix energetico, la dipendenza del paese dai mercati internazionali appare destinata a rimanere un tratto strutturale anche nel prossimo futuro. Gli sforzi compiuti per superare questo stato di cose si sono espressi in una strategia di 'à totu azimut', volta a (i) differenziare i mercati di approvvigionamento, (ii) rafforzare i legami commerciali già esistenti con i partner tradizionali e (iii) mettere a valore le riserve ancora inutilizzate, soprattutto nelle regioni meridionali e in Sicilia. Il Medio Oriente e il Nord Africa rimangono referenti fondamentali, ma l'Italia è anche coinvolta anche nel Mediterraneo orientale, nello sviluppo di percorsi alternativi per bypassare la congestionata stretta del Bosforo. Da questo punto di vista, le infrastrutture svolgono un ruolo essenziale nella strategia di sicurezza energetica italiana. L'apertura di nuovi collegamenti tra il Mar Nero, l’Europa orientale e il Mediterraneo, accrescendo il peso delle forniture provenienti dall'Asia centrale e dal Caucaso, potrebbe contribuire a ridurre la dipendenza del paese dai suoi fornitori tradizionali. Inoltre, l'apertura di questi collegamenti, unita a un potenziamento del settore dell’LNG, rafforzerebbero le credenziali dell'Italia come hub energetico del Mediterraneo centrale e la sua posizione complessiva nell'industria europea del petrolio e del gas. Un altro pilastro di questa strategia è lo sviluppo di legami più forti con la Russia, ad esempio attraverso l'accordo strategico firmato fra ENI e Gazprom nel novembre 2006, l'acquisizione di Yukos da parte del consorzio Enineftegas (60% ENI; 40% Enel) nell'aprile 2007 e la firma, nel giugno 2007, del memorandum d'intesa tra ENI e Gazprom per la costruzione e la gestione del collegamento 'South Stream'. Tuttavia, questa strategia deve affrontare una forte concorrenza internazionale. UE e Stati Uniti hanno espresso i loro timori circa le implicazioni politiche del progetto South Stream, che – secondo i suoi critici – renderebbe la Russia l'attore dominante sul mercato del gas europeo. I rapporti difficili della Turchia con UE sono un altro elemento da considerare. In questa prospettiva e nonostante le incertezze che circondano i programmi EU INOGATE e TRACECA, un itinerario interamente europeo, che raggiunga Vienna e/o la costa adriatica attraverso i Balcani orientali e occidentali, sembra godere di maggiore favore rispetto a uno in gran parte anatolico, gravitante sul Mediterraneo sud-orientale e che rafforzerebbe il potere contrattuale di Ankara. Considerazioni politiche ed economiche, sia a livello nazionale sia internazionale, si confondono, quindi, nel definire l’effettiva sostenibilità della strategia energetica italiana. Senza dimenticare il ruolo che la crescente domanda di energia dell'Asia giocherà in futuro, e gli effetti che potrà avere sulle scelte commerciali delle ex repubbliche sovietiche e dei paesi del Golfo.
Pastori, G., Between Continuity and Change: the Italian Approach to Energy Security, in Marquina Barrio, A. (ed.), Energy Security. Visions from Asia and Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, HOUNDMILLS BASINGSTOKE -- GBR 2008: 84- 100. 10.1057/9780230595002_6 [http://hdl.handle.net/10807/38810]
Between Continuity and Change: the Italian Approach to Energy Security
Pastori, Gianluca
2008
Abstract
Italy’s dependence from fossil fuels, coupled with its long-lasting choice to do without nuclear energy in power generation, makes the country highly vulnerable to any shortage affecting both oil and gas sectors, and/or to abnormal increases in their international prices. In both sectors, suppliers are highly concentrated, and this fact, coupled with the lack of domestic production, increases Italian vulnerability. Despite a recent shift in the energy mix, dependence from the international markets will remain, in the foreseeable future, a structural tract of the Italian energy structure. Efforts to override this state of things focus on a ‘whole azimuth’ strategy, aimed at differentiating the supply markets, strengthening the commercial ties already existing with the traditional partners, and putting on stream still unexploited national reserves, especially in southern regions and Sicily. Middle East and North Africa remain key points of reference, but Italy is also involved in Eastern Mediterranean, in the development of alternative routes to the congested Bosporus Straits. From this point of view, infrastructures play an essential role within the framework of the Italian energy security strategy. The opening of new links between the Black Sea, Eastern Europe, and the Mediterranean would increase Italian reliance on Central Asian and Caucasus oil and gas, and reduce national dependency from its traditional supply markets. Moreover, the opening of these links – coupled with a general improvement of the Italian LNG sector – would enhance Italy’s role as one of the main energy hub in central Mediterranean, and strengthen the country’s overall position in the European oil and gas industry. The other pillar is the development of stronger ties with Russia, for example through the strategic agreement signed with Gazprom in November 2006, the acquisition of Yukos by the Enineftegas consortium (60% ENI; 40% Enel) in April 2007, and the signing in June 2007 of a MOU between ENI and Gazprom for the building and managing of the new ‘South Stream’ pipeline. However, this strategy is deemed to face a strong international competition. Both EU and the US have shown their concerns about the political implications of the South Stream project, which would make Russia – according to its critics – the dominant actor on the European gas market. Turkey’s difficult relations with EU are another important element to deal with. In this perspective, and despite the uncertainties still surrounding the EU INOGATE and TRACECA programmes, an all-European route reaching Vienna and/or the Adriatic coast through the Eastern and Western Balkans seems to enjoy greater favour than a largely Anatolian one, somehow gravitating on South-Eastern Mediterranean, and enhancing Ankara’s bargaining power. Political and economic considerations, both at domestic and international level, will, thus, intermingle in defining Italian strategy’s effective viability. Not to forget the role that Asia’s increasing energy demand will play in the future, and the effects it will have on commercial decisions of the Former Soviet Republics and of the Gulf countries.
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